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Figure 1: CNN-based approaches for image forgery detection tend to overfit to the source training data and perform bad on new unseen
manipulations. ForensicTransfer introduces a new autoencoder-based architecture that is able to overcome this problem given only few
labeled target examples. The idea is to learn a discriminative feature representation in the latent space so that only specific components of
the hidden vector are activated for the pristine and forged classes.
Abstract
Distinguishing manipulated from real images is be-
coming increasingly difficult as new sophisticated image
forgery approaches come out by the day. Naı¨ve classifica-
tion approaches based on Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) show excellent performance in detecting image ma-
nipulations when they are trained on a specific forgery
method. However, on examples from unseen manipulation
approaches, their performance drops significantly. To ad-
dress this limitation in transferability, we introduce Forensic-
Transfer (FT). We devise a learning-based forensic detector
which adapts well to new domains, i.e., novel manipulation
methods and can handle scenarios where only a handful of
fake examples are available during training. To this end, we
learn a forensic embedding based on a novel autoencoder-
based architecture that can be used to distinguish between
real and fake imagery. The learned embedding acts as a
form of anomaly detector; namely, an image manipulated
from an unseen method will be detected as fake provided it
maps sufficiently far away from the cluster of real images.
Comparing to prior works, FT shows significant improve-
ments in transferability, which we demonstrate in a series of
experiments on cutting-edge benchmarks. For instance, on
unseen examples, we achieve up to 85% in terms of accuracy,
and with only a handful of seen examples, our performance
already reaches around 95%.
1. Introduction
Image manipulation is as old as photography itself [16];
however, with recent advances in machine learning and
synthetic image rendering, it has reached unprecedented
levels of diffusion and sophistication. Manipulations that
were once possible only for high-budget movie productions
are now within the reach of anyone who can access large
amounts of data — a democratization of high quality image
and video synthesis. This development is the outcome of
intense research in computer vision, driven by market de-
mands in the movie industry, photography, virtual reality,
game playing, and autonomous driving. A major focus of
research has been face synthesis and manipulation. Nowa-
days, we can generate entirely synthetic faces [10, 28], even
at very high-resolutions [25, 26], animate a subject’s face to
make it express the desired emotions [5, 37], or modify facial
expressions [47, 45, 27]. Beyond faces, a number of generic
image manipulation methods have been proposed. It is now
possible to transfer semantic content from a source domain
to a target domain characterized by a different style [56, 26],
create automatically image compositions [57], and recon-
struct missing image parts by semantic inpainting [30, 24].
It is worth noting that most of these operations can be carried
out using several editing tools (e.g., Photoshop, GIMP), and
with some manual effort achieve highly convincing results.
Although these processing tools were originally designed
for benign applications, they can also be used to perform
high-quality image forgeries. Realistic fake content can
have a high impact on people’s lives, as demonstrated by
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the Deepfake app [1]. They can be used to support fake
news, and cause their viral spread over ubiquitous social
networks. Therefore, it is critical to develop methods that
allow the reliable detection of such manipulations, and there
has been growing attention towards this goal in the research
community.
Deep neural networks have proven to be very effective
for this task and several works can be found in the cur-
rent literature [7, 12, 38, 40, 3]. These methods heavily
rely on a sufficient number of training examples and the
performance impairs dramatically when new types of ma-
nipulations are presented, even though they are semantically
close. The underlying neural networks quickly overfit to
manipulation-specific artifacts, thus learning features that
are highly discriminatory for the given task but severely lack
transferability. This weakness can be partially addressed by
fine-tuning a pre-trained network with new task-specific data,
but this means that large amounts of new data are necessary.
Due to the high dynamics in the field of digital content
synthesis this is not feasible and introduces a huge time
delay for every new method that has to be debunked. Ideally,
one would like to detect a forgery even if the network has
not been trained for it, or if only a few labeled examples
are available. The goal of this work is to develop a CNN-
based method that ensures such generalization; i.e., being
able to transfer knowledge between different but related
manipulations. Specifically, we suppose to have a network
trained to detect a specific manipulation and want to extend
its capability to similar ones. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work addressing this problem in the context
of multimedia forensics. To this end, we make the following
contributions:
• a novel autoencoder-based neural network architecture,
that learns a model for a derived forensic embedding,
capable of transferring between different manipulation
domains,
• a thorough ablation study of our proposed method, in-
cluding a survey on existing baseline methods,
• and state-of-the-art detection accuracies that enable
robust forgery detection even when no or only a handful
of training samples of a new manipulation are available.
2. Related work
While the main focus of our work lies in the field of
media forensics, ForensicTransfer also intersects with the
field of transfer learning. There is a wide range of image
forgery detection methods. These methods can be divided
into traditional model-based and learning-based approaches.
Traditional Media Forensics Traditional model-based
approaches exploit a specific clue, like inconsistencies at
pixel-level related for example to JPEG compression arti-
facts [4], demosaicking clues [17], lens aberration [51], or
camera noise [34]. They are very effective, but also very
sensitive to the assumed hypotheses. Robustness is much
more ensured by physics-based approaches that rely on in-
consistencies in illumination or perspective mappings [15];
however, they are still not able to provide a performance
comparable to pixel-based methods in realistic situations.
Learned Media Forensics Recently, the research commu-
nity has shown that supervised deep learning approaches
can achieve impressive detection results. Similar to the tra-
ditional media forensics, the first approaches concentrated
on the high-frequency pixel-level signals. This can be ac-
complished by adding a first layer of fixed high-pass filters
[39, 32], learned filters [7], or even by recasting hand-crafted
features working on residuals as a convolutional neural net-
work (CNN) [12]. Two-stream networks are used to exploit
both low-level and high-level features [55]. Other archi-
tectures try to exploit sharp discontinuities created by the
editing process, such as the boundary artifacts occurring
when an object is spliced into the image [42, 6].
A significant performance gap can be observed by very
deep networks, especially, on compressed data [40], which
is critical to detect fake content on social networks. All pro-
posed learning-based methods need some form of finetuning
on a dataset that comprises manipulations aligned with the
ones present in the test set. But often the underlying datasets
are limited and prone to polarization, e.g., when a limited
number of cameras is used. To avoid any form of polarization
on the training-set, recent approaches have adopted Siamese
networks to train couples of patches [23, 13]. This way, they
do not need to rely on a specific training set, since they are
acting as anomaly detectors on a pixel-level basis. Hence,
their performance is much more effective on localization
than on detection.
Recently, there are has been some effort in the detection
of more recent manipulations that have been created using
deep learning (i.e. deepfakes). Some papers have focused
their effort in the detection of manipulations on faces [3, 20]
or GAN generated images [35, 53]. In contrast to these meth-
ods, we are not restricted to a specific type of manipulation
and only need a few samples to adapt to new manipulations.
Transfer learning Transfer learning is an important prob-
lem in the vision community, especially, in deep learning
which relies on a large amount of training data compared to
traditional machine learning approaches. When the distribu-
tions of training and test data do not match (domain shift),
the network has to be re-trained on a large labeled dataset,
and this is not easily feasible. In the literature several solu-
tions have been proposed to adapt the source domain to the
target domain in different scenarios [14, 21, 49]. A possible
direction is to use an autoencoder to learn a latent embedding
in the source domain from which the feature space in the
target domain is derived [19, 8]. This is as also carried out
in [29] to learn a better semantic representation in the Zero
Shot Learning scenario.
The Few Shot Learning scenario is particularly interesting
in our context, since it helps learning generalization using
a limited amount of labeled examples. ForensicTransfer is
designed for the forensic analysis of imagery, i.e., we are
interested in two classes – pristine vs forged images. This
restriction is different to the traditional setting in the com-
puter vision community which focuses on a large number
of classes, resulting in approaches that aim at learning good
model initialization, learning image similarity or learning to
augment data through a proper generator [9].
3. Proposed Method
We propose a new CNN-based image manipulation detec-
tor which provides state-of-the-art performance on known
manipulations and generalizes well to new forms of manip-
ulations. ForensicTransfer: i) provides the same excellent
performance as other deep nets over known manipulations,
when plenty of labeled examples are available, ii) general-
izes better than these competitors to unseen manipulations
(zero-shot performance), and iii) improves effectively its
performance for new manipulations based on a very small
number of training examples (few-shot performance).
Our approach disentangles the information necessary to
make the real/fake decision in the source domain from a
faithful latent-space representation of the image, which may
be exploited in new target domains. To prevent the net from
discarding precious information during training, we rely on
autoencoder-based representation learning [48] by which the
latent space is constrained to preserve all the data necessary
to reconstruct the image in compact form.
Therefore, the latent space holds both the image represen-
tation and the data used for the real/fake decision, but these
pieces of information live in orthogonal spaces, and do not
interfere with one another. This is obtained by dividing the
latent space in two parts, one activated exclusively by real
samples, and the other by fake samples. Since the network
has to reproduce the image anyway, all relevant information
on the input image is stored in both parts. Thus, the features
of the learned forensic embedding keep all desired informa-
tion, useful for diverse forensic tasks, and easily adapted
to new domains based on a small number of new training
samples.
Forensic Embedding: Initially, we assume to have only
training data for the source domain, formed by the set
S1 =
{
xs1i
}N
i=1
comprising images tampered by the known
manipulation, and the set S0 =
{
xs0i
}N
i=1
of the correspond-
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(1) Training on Source domain
(2) Adaptation to Target domain
(3) Testing on Target domain
Figure 2: ForensicTransfer scheme. (1) We train our autoencoder-
based approach on a source domain, disentangling the fake and real
images in the latent space. (2) Using few target training samples
one can adapt to the target domain. (3) The latent space is used to
predict the class.
ing original images (or real images of the same typology if
the original images do not exist). Target domain manipula-
tions are defined correspondingly as T1 and T0.
As a preprocess, the input images are high-pass filtered,
in order to obtain the residual image which is known from
the multimedia forensics literature to store the most valuable
information for forgery detection. In particular, we apply a
third-order derivative in image space [12].
Our proposed detector is a neural network with an autoen-
coder structure where the encoding function E(·) maps the
image x to the latent vector h, and the decoding functionD(·)
processes the latter to provide an approximate reconstruction
xˆ, of the input image. To disentangle decision and recon-
struction, the latent vector h is split in two disjoint parts, h0
and h1, each associated with a class, real or fake. Accord-
ingly, the network is trained to activate only the part h0 if x
belongs to S0 and only h1 if x belongs to S1. At testing time,
the input image is classified as forged or real by measuring
the activations of the two parts. The class activation ac(x) is
measured through the `1-norm of the corresponding part of
the latent vector, that is ac(x) = 1Kc ‖Ec(x)‖1, where Kc is
the number of elements in hc of class c ∈ {0, 1}.
For a sample x of class c, the off-class part of the latent
space h1−c should remain silent, i.e., a1−c(x) = 0. On the
contrary, the in-class part of the latent space hc should be
active, with at least one non-zero element, such that ac(x) >
0. For simplicity, and without losing generality, we constrain
ac(x) to be equal to 1.
Loss: During the training phase, we enforce a reconstruc-
tion loss LREC on the output image of the autoencoder and
an activation loss LACT on the latent space:
L = γ · LREC + LACT ,
where γ weights the influence of the reconstruction error,
and is set to 0.1 for all our experiments. The reconstruction
loss LREC measures the difference of the input image x and
the reconstructed image xˆ which is given by D(E(x)) using
an `1-norm:
LREC = 1
K
·
∑
x∈S0∪S1
‖x− xˆ‖
1
,
where K is the number of components of the input sample.
The reconstruction constraint forces the net to store all rele-
vant data of the input in the latent vector. Hence, we avoid
to encode only the information directly useful for discrimi-
nating the source manipulation, allowing adaptation to novel
manipulations. The activation loss LACT is defined as:
LACT =
∑
x∈S0
|a0(x)− 1|+ |a1(x)| +∑
x∈S1
|a1(x)− 1|+ |a0(x)|
At test time, the decision on the presence of a forgery relies
on the strength of the activations. A sample x is considered
to be forged (c = 1) if a1(x) > a0(x), and real otherwise.
Unlike the widespread classification loss based on cross-
entropy, the proposed loss does not only force the separation
of the two classes, but also the reduction of the intra-class
variances, which improves transferability in our forensic ap-
plication. As a consequence, an unseen novel manipulation
can be more easily distinguished from the class of real im-
ages. In the literature, the importance of reducing intra-class
variances has been demonstrated in [22] for transfer learning
and in [9] for few-shot problems.
Transferability: Based on strength of the activations, we
are able to decide whether the input image is closer to the real
or to the forged images of the source domain. Having to deal
with a novel manipulation, where only a few examples are
available, we exploit a detector already trained on a “close”
manipulation, which can be assumed to share some artifacts
with the new one. Therefore, we fine-tune this detector to
the target domain using the available examples in T1 and T0
and the loss L.
Network architecture In this work we consider the
encoder-decoder architecture shown in Fig.3. Input images
have size 256× 256× 3 or 128× 128× 3 pixels, depending
on the dataset (see Sec. 5). The encoder and decoder have
mirrored structures, with 5 convolutional layers with a 3× 3
kernel each, and without skip connections. In the encoder, all
convolutions, except the first one, have stride 2, thus reduc-
ing spatial resolution by a factor 16 overall. To recover the
original size, the decoder employs a 2× 2 nearest-neighbor
Residual
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Conv 8*3x3
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Relu
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Batch Norm.
Figure 3: ForensicTransfer neural network architecture. As input
we take an image from which we first derive the residual image,
which is then fed into an encoder (left). The learned embedding
is constrained by the activations of the class loss (fake vs real), as
well as the reconstruction loss of the decoder (right).
up-sampling before each convolution except the last one.
All activation functions are ReLUs (Rectified Linear Units)
except for the hyperbolic tangent activation used in the last
layer to ensure the output to be in a pre-defined limited range.
The latent space at the encoder output, comprises 128 feature
maps, 64 associated with the class “real” and 64 with the
class “fake”. The selection block sets the off-class part of
latent space to zero, depending on the class label, forcing the
decoder to learn how to reconstruct the input sample only
from the same-class part of the latent space.
Training To evaluate its generalization capability, the net-
work is first trained on a dataset built w.r.t. a specific ma-
nipulation method (source domain). Then, it is fine-tuned
on a few images subject to a different, but similar, form of
manipulation (target domain). The fine-tuning procedure
allows the detection network to quickly adapt to the new
manipulation scenario, without the need to be re-trained.
For training, we use the ADAM gradient-based optimiza-
tion scheme with a learning rate of 0.001, a batch-size of 64
and default values for the moments (β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999
and epsilon= 10−7). We train the network until the loss,
evaluated on the validation, does not improve for 30 consec-
utive epochs.
4. Datasets
In our experiments we focus on manipulations performed
by computer graphics (CG) or deep learning methods, which
may involve parts of real images (for example, changes
only in the mouth) or the generation of whole synthetic
images (see Fig. 4). In all cases, we used large datasets
for the source domain and split each dataset in training,
validation and test. The few examples of the target dataset,
used for fine-tuning, are randomly extracted from the training
and validation sets. Note that we took care to pair two
different but related manipulations in all our experiments for
the source and target dataset. In the following we describe
each dataset. For easy reproducibility of our results, we will
publish our new datasets of synthetic and inpainted images.
Synthetic images: Because of the lack of publicly avail-
able dataset for forensic research purposes, we built 5
datasets of 30000 images each comprising images generated
using progressive GAN [25], Cycle-GAN [56], Style-GAN
[26], Glow [28], and StarGAN [10]. Progressive GAN and
Style-GAN generate high resolution faces, Cycle-GAN per-
forms image-to-image translation, and the last two methods
change attributes of a face. Except for the high resolution im-
ages of dimension 1024× 1024, all the other output images
are 256 × 256 pixels. The total number of 30000 images
per manipulation method is split into 21000, 6000 and 3000
image set for training, validation and test, respectively. For
our test we used the progressive GAN, Cycle-GAN and
StarGAN images as the source datasets while Cycle-GAN,
Style-GAN and Glow are chosen to be the target datasets,
respectively. Real faces come from CelebA-HQ dataset [25]
for ProGAN and StyleGAN, CelebA dataset [33] for Star-
GAN and Glow, and from [56] for Cycle-GAN.
Inpainted images: We built another two datasets of 20000
images each using inpainting-based manipulation methods.
To this end, we created a source database using the method
of Iizuka et al. [24] and a target database using Yu et al. [52].
The inpainting is applied to the central 128×128-pixel region
of the image. Since only the central region is manipulated,
we considered only this part as the input for the networks.
The set of 20000 images are split into 14000, 3000, 3000 im-
ages for training, validation and test, respectively. Original
images come from ImageNet [41].
CG-based manipulated faces: We are using the public
dataset FaceForensics, proposed in [40], with 1004 real
videos and 1004 fake ones manipulated by Face2Face [47].
We used the same original videos to create another dataset
of manipulated videos using FaceSwap [2]. The Face2Face
generated images are used as the source dataset and the
FaceSwap manipulation as the target dataset. The 1004
Source Domain Target Domain
Real Pro.GAN Real CycleGAN
Real StarGAN Real GLOW
Real Face2Face Real FaceSwap
Real Inp.2017 Real Inp.2018
Real CycleGAN Real StyleGAN
Figure 4: Examples of the different datasets. Source domain (left),
target domain (right).
videos are divided into 704 for training, 150 for validation
and 150 for testing. All videos have been compressed using
H.264 with quantization parameter set to 23. During the
training we used 200 frames from each video, while the test-
ing is performed on ten frames per video. For each frame,
we cropped all images to be centered around the face.
5. Results
In this section we give a thorough analysis of our ap-
proach. We show the impact of the design choices (see
Sec. 5.1), and show state-of-the-art detection results in com-
parison to forensic approaches and few-shot learning meth-
ods (see Sec. 5.2 and supplemental document). We also
analyze the influence of having multiple source domains on
the detectability of fakes in a target domain (see Sec. 5.3).
5.1. Ablation study
As an ablation study, we compare the performance of the
proposed method with four variants obtained by modifying
proposal no-reconstruction cross-entropy variant no-residual L-Softmax variant (m=4)
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(a) Inpainting [24] vs [52] (b) Pro.GAN [25] vs Cycle [56]
Figure 5: Comparison of the proposed method with three variants. Plots show the accuracy, averaged over 10 runs, versus number of images
used for fine-tuning.
Figure 6: Scatter plots of the two activations for images manipulated with inpainting, [24] vs [52]. The two rows show scatter plots related
to our proposal as well as results where the proposed activation function is replaced by the softmax/cross-entropy loss.
only a specific key aspect. In the no-residual variant, we
remove the preliminary high-pass filter, thus working on nat-
ural images rather than residuals. In the no-reconstruction
variant we remove the constraint on image reconstruction by
setting γ = 0, which amounts to canceling the term LREC
from the overall loss. In the cross-entropy variant, the pro-
posedLACT loss is replaced by a softmax/cross-entropy loss.
Finally, in the large-margin variant, the proposed LACT loss
is replaced by a Large-Margin softmax loss [31]. In Fig.5
we report the accuracy as a function of the number of target
samples used for adaptation (shots), considering only two
datasets pairings for brevity, Inpainting (left) and Pro/Cycle-
GAN (right). In both cases, results fully support our choices.
During fine-tuning, we also use a small validation set equal
to three-fifths of the small training set. The no-residual ver-
sion exhibits a dramatic impairment, with the performance
gap closing only after 100 or more examples, thus proving
the importance of focusing right-away on precious high-pass
details. A similar behavior is observed for the cross-entropy
version and the large-margin variant, confirming the sound-
ness of the proposed LACT loss. Instead, the reconstruction
constraint has only a minor impact on the second pairing, but
grants a significant improvement on the first one, with a 15%
initial gain which reduces only slowly with new examples.
With both dataset pairings, the proposed methods reaches
accuracies above 90% within five shots.
Fig. 6 shows the scatter plots of the two activations, a0(x)
and a1(x), for a number of test images, both real (green) and
fake (red), of the Inpainting pairing. The first plot on the left
shows that the two activations allow a reliable classification
of source-domain images. On target-domain images (second
column) the very same classifier fails to detect a good part of
the fakes, never seen before. However, a single-shot adapta-
tion (third column) allows a reasonable separation of the two
classes, which becomes already quite good when using 10
samples, and nearly perfect at 100. On the second row, we
Pro/Cycle Cycle/Style Star/Glow Inpainting Face2/Swap
S T S T S T S T S T
Bayar 99.92 50.42 98.92 55.93 99.98 50.00 99.08 50.10 92.93 52.87
Cozzolino 99.92 52.43 99.92 49.98 100.0 50.00 98.12 63.33 79.80 77.77
Rahmouni 100.0 49.87 98.85 62.52 100.0 50.00 95.35 52.02 93.57 70.87
MesoInc. 97.47 44.19 87.98 50.30 99.50 49.97 87.65 67.30 85.87 45.17
Xception 100.0 58.79 99.92 50.08 100.0 50.00 99.98 51.08 98.13 50.20
FT (ours) 100.0 85.00 100.00 90.53 100.0 82.05 99.77 70.62 94.47 72.57
Table 1: Accuracy on the Source dataset and Target dataset. All the methods perform very
well on the manipulations seen in the training set and much worse on new ones.
Accuracy on CycleGAN
one-to-one (Pro.GAN) 85.00
one-to-one (StarGAN) 77.26
one-to-one (Glow) 83.67
multi-to-one (StarGAN+Glow) 92.32
Table 2: Our approach enables the trans-
fer of detection abilities from multiple
source domains to a target domain. We
show zero-shot results using our approach
based on a one-to-one transfer in compari-
son to a multi-to-one transfer.
Bayar16 Cozzolino17 Rahmouni17 MesoInception-4 XceptionNet FT (ours)
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(a) Pro.GAN [25] vs Cycle [56] (b) Cycle [56] vs Style-GAN [26]
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(c) StarGAN [10] vs Glow [28] (d) Inpainting [24] vs [52]
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(e) Face2Face [47] vs FaceSwap [2] (f) StarGAN+Glow vs Cycle
Figure 7: Few-shot adaptation. Plots show accuracy versus number of images used for fine-tuning (shots). Values are averaged over 10 runs.
Note the zero and few-shot transferability of ForensicTransfer (FT, red curves).
show the same scatter plots when the proposed activation is
replaced by the softamx/cross-entropy loss. Source-domain
performance is as good as before, but results on the target do-
main are much worse in comparison to our approach. While
L1 forces the activations to a specific value, the cross-entropy
loss tries to push samples far from the separating hyper-plane
irrespectively of the intra-class variance. The low variance
gives an advantage when considering the target domain. As
a result, the distribution of the novel manipulation is more
easily distinguishable from the concentrated distribution of
real images.
5.2. Comparison with state-of-the-art
In this section we are comparing our method to sev-
eral state-of-the-art CNN-based detection methods. Ba-
yar16 [7] and Cozzolino17 [12] have been proposed to de-
tect generic manipulations based on a constrained network.
Rahmouni17 [38] detects computer-generated images, while
MesoInception-4 was proposed [3] for deepfake detection.
We are also considering a general-purpose state-of-the-art
deep network, XceptionNet [11], given the excellent perfor-
mance shown in [40] for facial manipulation detection. To
ensure fairness, all methods are trained exactly on the same
dataset as specified in the previous Section. When necessary,
images have been rescaled [11, 3] or clipped [7, 12, 38], to
match the size of the network input layer as specified in the
original papers.
Generalization analysis: First of all, we evaluate the abil-
ity of each network to detect a manipulation performed with
the same method seen in the training set (source) and with
a different method (target) without any form of fine-tuning.
This experiment is important to understand the intrinsic trans-
ferability of a network. We paired the datasets described in
Sec. 4 to consider similar types of manipulations. Results
are reported in Tab. 1. On the source domain, all meth-
ods, including the proposed ones, perform very well, with
accuracies close to 100%, which lower only on the video
datasets, where frames are subject to a much stronger com-
pression than images of the other datasets. When evaluating
the trained networks on the respective target domain, we ob-
serve a dramatic performance loss for all reference methods,
most of which provide accuracies close to 50%. Partial ex-
ceptions are represented by Cozzolino17, on the inpainting
and video datasets, and Rahmouni17, only on videos. Foren-
sicTransfer also shows a performance impairment; however,
the residual-based network maintains good performance;
e.g., 90% accuracy from Cycle [56] to Style-GAN [26].
Adaptation analysis: In Fig.7(a-e) we show accuracies
as a function of the number of target-domain training sam-
ples. Curves start from zero-shot values as discussed in the
generalization paragraph. For all reference methods, the
accuracy grows quite slowly with fine-tuning and in many
cases remains largely below 100% even at 100 training im-
ages. ForensicTransfer, instead, reaches a very high accuracy
with just a few shots, and outperforms all competitors with
a large margin. On Pro/Cycle-GAN (Fig.7(a)), the accu-
racy exceeds 90% at 4 shots, and reaches 100% before 100
sample images. Also on Cycle-GAN/StyleGAN (Fig.7(b))
results are very good, which shows ForensicTransfer is able
to transfer knowledge also from medium-quality to high-
quality generation domains. On StarGAN/Glow (Fig.7(c))
results are impressive and one shot is already enough. On In-
painting (Fig.7(d)), the 90% mark is reached with two shots,
and almost 100% using 100 training images. Only for the
more challenging Face2Face/Swap experiment (Fig.7(e)), a
slower growth and a smaller gain is observed, with Xception-
Net almost closing the gap at 100 shots, both with accuracy
exceeding 90%.
5.3. Multi-source experiments
In the previous experiments we are showing examples
of a one-to-one transferability of forgery detection. Given
multiple source domains, we can extend this idea to a many-
to-one transfer of knowledge. To this end, we train the
proposed network on a dataset of multiple sources. Specifi-
cally, we use the following methods for our experiment. As
source domain we generate images using StarGAN [10] and
Glow [28]. The target domain images are synthesized by a
CycleGAN [56]. Based on the images of the two source do-
mains, we train the encoder-decoder network, disentangling
the knowledge about real and fake images. In Tab. 2 we show
the zero-shot results in comparison to a one-to-one transfer.
The multi-source training improves the detection accuracy
of unknown forgeries in the target domain by at least 7%.
In Fig. 7(f), we compare the few-shot adaptation w.r.t. the
baseline methods. All methods are trained on both source
domains. As can be seen our approach behaves similarly to
the one-to-one experiments. Our approach outperforms all
baselines by more than 25% when there are less than 5 target
domain samples available.
6. Conclusion
We introduce ForensicTransfer a new method to facili-
tate transferability between image manipulation domains.
Specifically, we address the shortcomings of convolutional
neural networks, that when trained for a given manipulation
approach, are unable to achieve good detection results on
different edits – even when they are related. In comparison to
traditional learning techniques, we can achieve significantly
higher detection rates in cases where no or only a few train-
ing samples are available in the target domain. Overall, we
believe that our method is a stepping stone towards forgery
detectors that only need a few training samples of the target
domain.
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Supplemental Material
Given a database of manipulated images from a source
domain, we are able to detect fakes generated with a different
manipulation method (target domain). In this supplemental
document, we show, through visualization of the class acti-
vation maps, the transferability of our proposal respect to the
use of a classic classifier (Sec. D), then we report additional
ablation studies (Sec. A) as well as a comparison to few-shot
learning methods (see Sec. B). For reproducibility, we report
the hyperparameter of the used baseline methods from the
main paper (see Sec. C).
A. Ablation studies
In Fig. 8 we show an ablation study with respect to the
dimension of the forensic embedding. The results reported
in the main paper are based on a forensic embedding of size
128, where we are using 64 to encode pristine and another
64 to encode manipulated images. In this experiment, we
reduce and increase the number of features in the latent
space. Tab. 3 shows the zero-shot performance for a one-
to-one transfer on the inpainting dataset (Iizuka et al. [24]
as source and Yu et al. [52] as target domain). As can be
seen the dimensionality has an influence on the performance
and 128 is the sweet spot with the best performance. With
a lower or higher dimensionality of the feature space, the
transferability performance decreases, but it is still better or
comparable with respect to the baseline methods.
The few-shot adaptation experiment in Fig. 8 shows that
the performance of the 128 long feature space is consistently
better than the other configurations while they converge with
the number of samples from the target domain.
B. Comparison to few-shot learning methods
Few-shot learning is a relevant problem in many computer
vision applications and several methods have been proposed
especially with reference to image classification. In this sec-
tion, we describe briefly some of such methods and discuss
their performance when applied in our scenario.
Chen19 [9] proposes an approach where a feature extrac-
tor is followed by a classifier. The whole network is trained
on the source dataset, then the feature extractor is frozen, and
only the classifier is fine-tuned on new examples from the
target domain. A ResNet-18 is used for feature extraction,
while classification is carried out by a cosine similarity layer,
32 64 128 256 512
Accuracy 56.32 64.60 70.62 62.17 59.75
Table 3: Here, we show an ablative study regarding the dimension
of the forensic embedding. The results are based on a zero-shot
transfer scenario on the inpainting dataset.
which helps reducing intra-class variances [18].
FADA [36] resorts to adversarial learning to find a feature
space where the distributions of source and target samples
are aligned, ensuring reliable classification in both domains.
As proposed in the reference paper, we use a VGG-16 net
for feature extraction, a fully connected layer for classifi-
cation, and a network of 2 fully connected layers for the
discriminator used in adversarial learning.
MatchingNet [50], ProtoNet [43], and RelationNet [44]
are similar few-shot learning methods, based on the use of
suitable distance metrics. A network is first used to extract
feature vectors, and then a suitable distance metric is com-
puted to make predictions, by comparing the input with a
small support set of labeled examples. MatchingNet uses the
cosine similarity, ProtoNet the Euclidean distance with re-
spect to class-mean representation, and RelationNet relies on
an appropriately trained CNN. As feature extractor we use
always a ResNet-18, which was proven in [9] to work well
for all these methods. Then, we train the comparison model
in the source domain, and test it using the few examples of
the target domain as support set.
When used for few-shot learning on the Inpainting dataset
pairing, all these methods exhibit a disappointing perfor-
mance, with accuracy close to 50% and only slowly growing
with the number of examples. In addition, they are generally
much slower than ForensicTransfer, especially FADA due to
the adversarial learning. However, it is worth underlining
that all these methods were originally devised for problems
like image classification that presents a large number of
classes. Hence, using them in our two-class context may
prove sub-optimal.
C. Baseline methods
For the forensic baseline methods used in the main paper,
we use the Adam optimizer with the default values for the
moments (β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999) and different parameters
0 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 25 50 100
# of target images for fine tuning
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Ac
cu
ra
cy
32
64
128
256
512
Figure 8: In this graph, we show the few-shot adaptation abilities
with different dimensions of the forensic embedding. Plots show
accuracy versus number of images used for fine-tuning (shots).
Values are averaged over 10 runs.
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Figure 10: Two examples of images manipulated with
Face2Face [47] and FaceSwap [2] (left) and their corresponding
class activation maps, when the network (XceptionNet [11]) is
trained on Face2Face forgeries (middle) and when it is trained on
FaceSwap ones (right).
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Figure 9: Comparison of the proposed method with recent Few-
shot learning methods. The plot shows accuracy versus number
of images used for fine-tuning (shots). The results are relative to
inpainting manipulations, [24] vs [52]. The values are averaged
over 10 runs.
for learning-rate and batch-size. In the following, we briefly
describe these baseline methods:
Bayar16 [7]: is a constrained network that uses a convo-
lutional layer designed to suppress the high-level content of
the image (total of 8 layers). The used learning-rate is 10−5
with batch-size 64.
Cozzolino17 [12]: is a CNN-based network that rebuilds
hand-crafted features used in the forensic community. We
adopt a learning-rate of 10−5 and a batch-size of 16.
Rahmouni17 [38]: integrates the computation of statisti-
cal feature extraction within a CNN framework. We adopt
the best performing network (Stats-2L) with a learning-rate
equal to 10−4 and a batch-size of 64.
MesoInception-4 [3]: is a CNN-based network proposed
to detect DeepFakes. The network includes inception mod-
ules inspired by InceptionNet [46]. During training, the
mean squared error between true and predicted labels is used
as loss instead of the classic cross-entropy loss. As proposed
by the authors, the learning-rate is initially 10−3 and is re-
duced by a factor of ten for each 1000 iterations. The used
batch-size is 76.
XceptionNet [11]: is based on depth-wise separable
convolution layers with residual connections. XceptionNet
is pre-trained on ImageNet. We adopt a learning-rate of
10−3 and a batch-size of 64.
The training for all methods process is stopped when the
validation accuracy does not improve for 10 consecutive
epochs and we save the network weights relative to the best
validation accuracy.
D. Activation maps
In this section we want to carry out a further experiment
to gain better insights on the ability of our proposal to trans-
fer to different but closely related manipulations with respect
to existing CNN-based detectors. To showcase this prob-
lem, we trained XceptionNet [11] on images generated by
Face2Face [47], which achieves an accuracy of 98.13%. A
similar performance is achieved when the network is trained
to detect images generated by FaceSwap [2], achieving an
accuracy of 98.30%. In Fig. 10, we show two examples of
class activation maps (CAMs), obtained using the approach
proposed by [54], for the same subject manipulated with
the two approaches. They clearly show that the network
learns to focus on some specific features based on the type
of forgery. As an undesired consequence, a forged image
which lacks these artifacts may escape the detector scrutiny.
This becomes problematic when we swap the test sets: now,
we train on Face2Face and test on FaceSwap and vice-versa.
Thus, train and test sets are generated from different (even
though related) approaches. Therefore, the cross-domain
accuracies drop to 50.20% and 52.73%, respectively – this
is only marginally better than random chance.
Our proposal, ForensicTransfer, is a CNN-based forensic
detector that tackles the problem of detecting novel unseen
Face2Face FaceSwap (a) FaceSwap (b)
Figure 11: Class activation maps for our method when it is trained
on Face2Face [47] and tested on Face2Face forgeries (left) or
FaceSwap [2] (middle), and finally trained on Face2Face but fine-
tuned using only four images manipulated with FaceSwap and
tested on FaceSwap (right).
manipulation methods, without the need of a large amount of
training data. Given a new image from a target domain, one
can use the encoder trained on source domain to determine
the forensic embedding. Based on the classification rule
mentioned in the main paper, we are able to decide whether
the input is closer to the real or to the fake images of the
source domain. If the two manipulation methods share spe-
cific artifacts, a fake image of the target domain is closer to
the fake images of the source domain. Given a few samples
of the target domain we are able to fine-tune the classifier.
To proof the transferability of our proposal, we compare
the results using our novel approach by visualizing the class
activation maps (see Fig. 11, cp. to Fig. 10). In contrast to a
deep CNN like XceptionNet, our approach is able to adapt
to the different artifacts of Face2Face and FaceSwap (the
nose in the first case, the eyebrows and mouth in the second
case). Fine-tuning on few images further helps to rely on
these different artifacts.
